Existence as a Predicate in the Transcendental-hermeneutic Tradition

In the present thesis we explore such a problem in the philosophy as the predicate of being. This modus of thought originates from the Antic Greek. Many philosophers, almost all great philosophers were interested in this question. The main purpose of this research is to describe the evolution of this basic concept that has great importance for the whole philosophy from Kant’s famous thesis that “being is not a real predicate” to the contemporary philosophy: could be the being a predicate, what is the status of this predication or it could not be a predicate at all. The interest in the philosophy and in the logics of transcendental slant on the question has increased significantly. A whole philosophic tradition after Kant disclosed the importance of the problem on being as a predicate. Moreover, such an important metaphysical and logical notion like being cannot be ignored even by analytical philosophers. By looking at preliminary research, it becomes clear that the following representatives have a significant influence on the development of the philosophical question of being in the last few centuries: they are I. Kant, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, H. Rickert, E. Kassirer, H.-H. Hadamer, K.-O. Apel. Also for a complete picture, we need not only to turn to the transcendental ontology, but also to an entirely different tradition, the tradition of analytic philosophy, namely to G. Frege, L. Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson. This paper overviews several most significant views, principally in the area of transcendental-hermeneutic tradition, which could be used in the study of the predicate of being and the problems, which are connected with it. Furthermore, this paper was conceived as a first step to the following research and comparative analysis of this issue for the whole reconstruction of this problem in the history of philosophy.