• A
  • A
  • A
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • ABC
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Regular version of the site
Language Proficiency
English
Contacts
Phone:
(495) 772-95-90
27160
E-mail:
Address: 11 Pokrovsky Bulvar, Pokrovka Complex, room S1009
Timetable
Download CV
ORCID: 0000-0002-9893-9192
ResearcherID: P-8253-2017
Scopus AuthorID: 57200224536
Google Scholar
Office hours
Monday, 4.30–6 pm
Supervisor
S. E. Pekarski
Printable version

 

Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!
To be used only for spelling or punctuation mistakes.

Anastasia Antsygina

  • Anastasia Antsygina has been at HSE University since 2017.

Education and Degrees

  • 2017

    PhD
    European University Institute in Florence

  • 2012

    Master's
    Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin

Student Term / Thesis Papers

Full list of of student term / thesis papers

Courses (2019/2020)

Courses (2018/2019)

Courses (2017/2018)

Microeconomics-2 (Bachelor’s programme; Faculty of Economic Sciences; field of study "38.03.01. Экономика", field of study "38.03.01. Экономика"; 2 year, 1, 2 module)Eng

Conferences

  • 2020

    St. Petersburg Economic Seminar (Санкт-Петербург). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • 2019

    Bern Workshop on Contest Theory (Bern). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents

  • ASSET (Athens). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents

  • NES Brown Bag Seminar (Москва). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • 2018

    The Micro and Macro Foundations of Conflict (Bath). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • 2017

    RES PhD Meeting (London). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • SAET (Faro). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • Contests: Theory and Evidence (Norwich). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • iCare 5 Conference (Пермь). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • 2016

    SAEe Meeting (Bilbao). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Empirical Application

  • Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (Edinburg). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

Research Papers

1. Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents – submitted

We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes the aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer cannot assign player-specific prizes, the loser must get a positive reward. This is in stark contrast to the existing literature. Such allocation eliminates the advantage of the stronger competitor and incentivizes the opponent to exert more effort. Using data from four professional tennis competitions where prizes include money and the ATP ranking points, we propose a structural estimator and recover contestants’ skill- preference profiles. The identification strategy relies on the ATP betting market efficiency, exogenous variation in monetary and non-monetary prizes, and the random matching between players. We show that both reward items shape contestants’ incentives to exert effort and document a strong positive correlation between preferences over the two prize dimensions. Our counterfactual experiments reveal that the increase in first-round monetary losing rewards can indeed improve the total effort.

2. Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva) – submitted

Settlements are hailed as a cost-efficient way to resolve civil cases, but the affluent settling with the disadvantaged can also be a symptom of unequal access to justice. We develop a model where the defendant (he) decides to either settle with the victim (she) or enter the contest to win in court. In the contest, both must exert costly effort subject to resource constraints. Relaxing the defendant’s constraint has two effects. First, it allows him to make better offers and, hence, settle more often (the volume effect). Second, additional resources improve the defendant’s bargaining position forcing the victim accept lower compensation (the price effect). Exploiting the blurred line between civil and criminal litigation and the random nature of traffic collisions, we apply the model to data on criminal traffic offenses in Russia. To test for the price effect, we focus on policemen whose connections or inside knowledge affect their resource constraint in the contest stage but not in the settlement stage. Our results indicate that policemen indeed settle more often as defendants and less often as victims than a comparable resource group. The price effect can be especially worrying in the context of intentional crimes when the defendant can choose the victim.

3. The Optimal Information Revelation in Contests with Stochastic Abilities (with Mariya Teteryatnikova)

We develop a model where two ex-ante identical players with stochastic abilities engage in a contest game. Before the competition starts, the designer, who aims to maximize the aggregate effort, gets a precise signal S and learns the ability profile. Prior to that, she commits to either (1) publicly disclose all information, or (2) disclose player- specific signals only, or (3) not disclose anything, or (4) use any combination of these three policies. Such rules are referred as simple disclosure regimes. We characterize the designer’s choice and find that public disclosure is never optimal. Such a policy results in a heterogeneous contest with a strictly positive probability, which reduces the expected aggregate effort. If the difference between various ability realizations is sufficiently small and high skills are relatively unlikely, the designer must report a profile where both contestants have high skills publicly and disclose other signals privately. Otherwise, she has to make all profiles with identical skills common knowledge and send an empty message in asymmetric states. Doing so, the designer keeps the competition even and at the same time provides some information to contestants. Alternatively, the designer can choose a persuasion disclosure rule and redefine the contestants’ types. We find that the optimal persuasion policy is unique, symmetric and anonymous. Moreover, it tends to outperform the best disclosure rule in the class of simple policies.

Work in Progress

1. The Optimal Information Revelation in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players

2. The Optimal Feedback Policy in Dynamic Contests with Linked Players (with Mariya Teteryatnikova)

Timetable for today

Full timetable

Impressions from the 19th April Conference

After the conference is over it’s time to reflect on what this year has brought to plan for the participation in the next year’s event, and The HSE Look talked to several internationally recruited HSE faculty members about what they value most about participating in the April Conference and what topics and discussions they found most interesting this year.

Welcome Aboard: Tenure-Track Introductions

Every year The HSE Look continues its tradition of welcoming newly recruited international faculty via short summaries about their positions and research interests. In the 34th issue we introduce the tenure-track faculty members, and in November you can learn more about post-doctoral researchers who are starting their work at HSE this fall.