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Regular version of the site
Language Proficiency
English
Contacts
Phone:
+7 (495) 772-95-90
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Address: 11 Pokrovsky Bulvar, Pokrovka Complex, room S1009
Timetable
ORCID: 0000-0002-9893-9192
ResearcherID: P-8253-2017
Scopus AuthorID: 57200224536
Google Scholar
Office hours
Friday, 16:20–17:40 (via Zoom) or by appointment
Supervisor
S. E. Pekarski
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Anastasia Antsygina

  • Anastasia Antsygina has been at HSE University since 2017.

Education and Degrees

  • 2017

    PhD
    European University Institute in Florence

  • 2012

    Master's
    Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin

  • 2010

    Bachelor's
    Gorky Ural State University

Awards and Accomplishments

Best Teacher – 2021, 2020

Administrative Duties

1. The All-Russian Olympiad for Schoolchildren “Vysshaya Proba” (the field of Economics) – head of the organising committee/jury (2018/2019 academic year), organising committee (2019/2020 and 2020/2021 academic year). 

2. Participation in defense committees for BA and MA students.

3. Review of submissions to the XX April International Academic Conference on Economics and Social Development (Moscow, Russia).

4. Referee for HSE WP BRP Series.

5. Referee for Economic Journal, Southern Economic Journal, International Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of the European Economic Association, Games and Economic Behaviour, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

Courses (2021/2022)

Courses (2020/2021)

Courses (2019/2020)

Courses (2018/2019)

Courses (2017/2018)

Microeconomics-2 (Bachelor’s programme; Faculty of Economic Sciences; field of study "38.03.01. Экономика", field of study "38.03.01. Экономика"; 2 year, 1, 2 module)Eng

Publications2

Conferences

  • 2021
    SAET (Seoul). Presentation: Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Stochastic Prize Valuations
  • GAMES 2020.1 (Budapest). Presentation: Optimal Information Disclosure in Contests with Stochastic Prize Valuations
  • Contests: Theory and Evidence (Berlin). Presentation: Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players
  • EARIE (Bergen). Presentation: Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players
  • 2020

    St. Petersburg Economic Seminar (Санкт-Петербург). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • 2019

    Bern Workshop on Contest Theory (Bern). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents

  • ASSET (Athens). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents

  • NES Brown Bag Seminar (Москва). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • Workshop on Information Acquisition, Diffusion and Disclosure in Markets (Вена). Presentation: The Optimal Information Revelation in Contests with Stochastic Abilities
  • 2018

    The Micro and Macro Foundations of Conflict (Bath). Presentation: Settlements under Unequal Access to Justice: Why Do Policemen in Russia Settle as Often as CEOs? (with Madina Kurmangaliyeva)

  • 2017

    RES PhD Meeting (London). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • SAET (Faro). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • Contests: Theory and Evidence (Norwich). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • iCare 5 Conference (Пермь). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

  • 2016

    SAEe Meeting (Bilbao). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and Empirical Application

  • Econometric Society European Winter Meeting (Edinburg). Presentation: Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents: Theory and an Empirical Application

Research Papers

1. Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents – submitted

We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes the aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer cannot assign player-specific prizes, the loser must get a positive reward. This is in stark contrast to the existing literature. Such allocation eliminates the advantage of the stronger competitor and incentivizes the opponent to exert more effort. Using data from four professional tennis competitions where prizes include money and the ATP ranking points, we propose a structural estimator and recover contestants’ skill- preference profiles. The identification strategy relies on the ATP betting market efficiency, exogenous variation in monetary and non-monetary prizes, and the random matching between players. We show that both reward items shape contestants’ incentives to exert effort and document a strong positive correlation between preferences over the two prize dimensions. Our counterfactual experiments reveal that the increase in first-round monetary losing rewards can indeed improve the total effort.

2. Information Disclosure in Contests with Communication 

We study information disclosure in static contests where players do not know their own values of winning. The designer chooses a disclosure policy that maximizes the total expected effort and commits to it before learning the realized value profile. The available disclosure regimes include (1) public disclosure, (2) private disclosure, when each contestant learns only his own type, and (3) concealment. A distinct feature of our model is that before the actual competition starts, contestants are allowed to communicate with each other by sending informative (truthful) or uninformative (empty) messages independently and simultaneously. Our results show that under private disclosure, the contestants reveal their types with a positive probability. The designer’s choice of the disclosure regime depends on the communication technology. If this technology is assortative (the types get revealed more often when the contestants’ values of winning are the same), then concealment always delivers the highest total effort. With a disassortative technology, the designer must choose private disclosure if and only if the correlation between the contestants’ values of winning is sufficiently high. These results are in a stark contrast with the no communication benchmark.

3. Optimal Information Disclosure in Competing Contests with Capacity Constrained Players 

This paper studies optimal information disclosure in competing contests with identical players. Each player faces a capacity constraint on the total effort contribution and is ex ante uninformed about the difficulty of the task to be performed in one of the contests. The task can be either difficult (associated with a high effort cost) or easy (associated with a low effort cost). Before the game starts, the designer of a contest with the unknown task can commit to (1) fully disclose the task type or to (2) keep it private in order to maximize the aggregate effort exerted in her competition. When the capacity constraint is slack, the game between contests is equivalent to the non-competitive case. Otherwise, the contests become linked, and there is a substitution effect which forces the players to reallocated their effort to a competition they perceive as easiest. If the difficult task is sufficiently costly, then full disclosure generates substantial competitive gains from revealing the easy task and, hence, mitigates the substitution effect. When the cost of performing a difficult task declines, full disclosure results in significant competitive losses from revealing the difficult task to the contestants, and concealment turns to be more attractive.

Work in Progress

Adverse Selection in Job Promotion Contests with Multi-Dimensional Skills (with Anna Ponomarenko)

Employment history

September 2011– August 2017: Teaching Assistant, Department of Econometrics and Statistics, HSEM, UrFU (Ekaterinburg, Russia)

September 2016 – May 2017: Teaching Assistant for Prof. Filippo Taddei, The Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Europe (Bologna, Italy)

 

Timetable for today

Full timetable

Impressions from the 19th April Conference

After the conference is over it’s time to reflect on what this year has brought to plan for the participation in the next year’s event, and The HSE Look talked to several internationally recruited HSE faculty members about what they value most about participating in the April Conference and what topics and discussions they found most interesting this year.

Welcome Aboard: Tenure-Track Introductions

Every year The HSE Look continues its tradition of welcoming newly recruited international faculty via short summaries about their positions and research interests. In the 34th issue we introduce the tenure-track faculty members, and in November you can learn more about post-doctoral researchers who are starting their work at HSE this fall.