Recent Advances in Auction Theory

2025/2026

Academic Year

ENG

Instruction in English

3

ECTS credits

Delivered at:

Department of Theoretical Economics

Course type:

Elective course

When:

4 year, 3 module

Instructor

Antsygina, Anastasia

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course overviews the standard models of an auction. First, we will get familiar with the existing auction formats and learn when each of them is preferable. Second, we will study a classical auction for a single, indivisible object in detail, and establish the main results in mechanism design, such as the revelation principle, revenue equivalence, and the seller-optimal auction. Third, we will make the model more realistic and complement it with endogenous entry, information acquisition, and multiple objects to sell. Fourth, we will discuss the theory behind several empirical approaches used in auction studies. Finally, we will examine other auction-like mechanisms that characterize a wide range of real life interactions: contests, or all-pay auctions, where players compete for prizes by exerting effort, and a simple model of internet ad auctions. The course targets 3rd and 4th year BA students who already know the key principles of economic thinking, are familiar with the core disciplines, such as Microeconomics and Game Theory, and have the skills to solve theoretical models. The main activities include (1) lectures, (2) students’ presentations, (3) home assignments, (4) one mid-term test, and (5) a final test. The discipline is instructed in English.