Бакалавриат
2026/2027
Дизайн экономических механизмов
ID 1134019
Статус:
Курс обязательный (Международная программа по бизнесу и экономике)
Кто читает:
Департамент экономики
Где читается:
Санкт-Петербургская школа экономики и менеджмента
Когда читается:
4-й курс, 1 модуль
Охват аудитории:
для своего кампуса
Преподаватели:
Кондратьев Алексей Юрьевич
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
4
Контактные часы:
42
Course Syllabus
Abstract
Mechanism design is a science of how to construct economic mechanisms (rules, environments, institutions) with desirable properties. While the usual microeconomic approach aims at understanding how agents behave in certain environments given certain rules, Mechanism design aims at finding "good" rules that lead to desirable outcomes. At the same time the rules themselves have to be simple and non-manipulable, i.e. provide incentives to participate sincerely.
Learning Objectives
- Mechanism design uses game theory tools and can be considered as its most applied part. The range of applications is very broad: from auctions and internet marketplaces to admission of young students to colleges, voting mechanisms, online dating services, and many others. The course will provide an overview of general methods used to design mechanisms in different areas of life.
Expected Learning Outcomes
- Able to identify deficiencies in real-life markets
- Know Revenue Equivalence Theorem, its assumptions and applications
- Know standard auction forms and able to find optimal bidding functions
- Know types of games and solution concepts
- Understand the main concepts and properties of mechanism design
- Able to define and apply fair division, assignment, matching and voting mechanisms; know properties of these mechanisms
Course Contents
- 1. Auction mechanisms
- 2. More about auctions
- 3. Matching mechanisms
- 4. Assignment mechanisms
- 5. Voting mechanisms
- 6. More about voting mechanisms.
- 7 Implementation of voting mechanisms
Bibliography
Recommended Core Bibliography
- Auction Theory: Introductory Exercises with Answer Keys-2nd ed Choi P. and Munoz-Garcia F. Springer Texts in Business and Economics (Ed. 2) 2025 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-93271-7
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, Gale D. and Shapley L.S. The American Mathematical Monthly, 5/1/2013 (First published: 2013) DOI: 10.4169/amer.math.monthly.120.05.386
Recommended Additional Bibliography
- Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate Felsenthal D.S. and Nurmi H. SpringerBriefs in Economics 2018 DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1