Магистратура
2026/2027



Продвинутая микроэкономика I
ID 1164839
Статус:
Курс обязательный (Аналитика данных для бизнеса и экономики)
Кто читает:
Департамент экономики
Где читается:
Санкт-Петербургская школа экономики и менеджмента
Когда читается:
1-й курс, 1 модуль
Охват аудитории:
для своего кампуса
Преподаватели:
Кучумова Юлия Андреевна
Язык:
английский
Кредиты:
3
Контактные часы:
28
Course Syllabus
Abstract
This course will provide the students with knowledge and understanding on how to model the behavior of agents in situations, where they have reason to act strategically. That is, the students will learn game theory, which is the systematic study of how rational agents behave in strategic situations, or in games, where each agent must first know the decision of the other agents before knowing which decision is best for himself.
The study of this discipline is based on the following disciplines: "Optimization", "Microeconomics-1", "Microeconomics-2", "Game Theory", "Probability Theory". The main provisions of the discipline should be used in future when studying the following disciplines: "Corporate Finance", "Theory of Finance-2", "Financial Markets", "Corporate Governance", "Theory of Industry Markets", "Public Sector Economics", "Labor Economics".
Learning Objectives
- • To get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games). • To learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, • To learn such equilibrium concepts for extensive-form games as backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium.
- • To get familiar with games in which the agents make a single, simultaneous choice (Strategic-form Games) and with games in which players may make choices in sequence (Extensive-form games). • To learn a variety of methods for determining the outcome of a game, which gives rise to a particular solution concept such as dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, • To learn such equilibrium concepts for extensive-form games as backward induction, subgame perfection, and sequential equilibrium.
Expected Learning Outcomes
- Able to solve professional problems based on synthesis and analysis
- Gain knowledge and skills in order to make management decisions in this area
- Distinguish between qualitative and quantitative research methods;
Course Contents
- 1. Foundations & Static Games of Complete Information
- 2. Games of Incomplete Information (Bayesian Games)
- 3. Dynamic Games & Perfect Information
- 4. Imperfect Information & Refinements
Interim Assessment
- 2026/2027 1st module0.2 * Test + 0.05 * In-class participation + 0.5 * Final exam + 0.25 * Homework assignments (HA)