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Бакалавриат 2020/2021

Теория контрактов и асимметричная информация

Статус: Курс по выбору (Экономика)
Направление: 38.03.01. Экономика
Когда читается: 3-й курс, 1 модуль
Формат изучения: без онлайн-курса
Охват аудитории: для своего кампуса
Язык: английский
Кредиты: 3

Course Syllabus

Abstract

This course provides an overview of the classical as well as advanced topics in contract theory. We are going to start with the classical principal-agent models of screening and moral hazard and learn how managers create incentives for their employees. These models involve two parties: a principal (e.g. manager) and an agent (e.g. employee). The principal delegates a task to the agent by offering him a contact. In the moral hazard problem, the agent's actions are hidden (noncontractible), yet they affect an outcome that can be included in a contract. In the screening problem, the agent has some private information relevant to the task. In both problems, asymmetric information creates inefficiency. In the second part of the course we consider various extensions of these two problems to many agents and dynamic environment. At the end of the course we'll shift gears to a different area of market design and learn how to get married (matching theory).
Learning Objectives

Learning Objectives

  • Understand consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations, when one party has more or better information on some aspect of relationship
  • Know how to evaluate the value of information
  • Know the basics of the theory of contracts and the trade-off between stimulation and warranty
  • Understand the consequences of endogenous information acquisition
Expected Learning Outcomes

Expected Learning Outcomes

  • Know how to evaluate the value of information
  • Know the ways to measure uncertainty
  • Understand efficiency/inefficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations, when one party has more or better information on some aspect of relationship
  • Understand the consequences of endogenous information acquisition
Course Contents

Course Contents

  • Adverse Selection: Akerloff model
  • Principal-Agent Problem with complete information: stimulation schemes
  • Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Type, i.e., Screening: (Menu of Contracts, Price Discrimination)
  • Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard)
Assessment Elements

Assessment Elements

  • non-blocking Class test 1
  • non-blocking Class test 2
  • non-blocking Class test 3
  • non-blocking Class test 4
Interim Assessment

Interim Assessment

  • Interim assessment (1 module)
    0.25 * Class test 1 + 0.25 * Class test 2 + 0.25 * Class test 3 + 0.25 * Class test 4
Bibliography

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

  • Merkl, C. (2012). Veldkamp, L.: Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance. Journal of Economics, 107(1), 97–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0282-8

Recommended Additional Bibliography

  • Krishna, V. (2010). Auction Theory (Vol. 2nd ed). Burlington, MA: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=297062