Кто читает:: Департамент прикладной экономики

Статус:: Курс обязательный

Когда читается:: 4-й курс, 2 модуль

Преподаватели

Агамирова Мария Евгеньевна

Казун Антон Павлович

Юдкевич Мария Марковна

Full Syllabus

Abstract

The Course on Institutional Economics is an essential step towards understanding institutions and their role in economics and society. During this course we will show that in a world where all transactions are connected with costs and people squint towards opportunism it is important to create rules and systematically monitor everyone following them. Together these rules and enforcement mechanisms are called institutions. The main objective of this course is to demonstrate how institutions work in various spheres, what happens if they become weak or inefficient. We will talk about the institution of property rights and about contracts, will look for historic examples and analyze modern cases, will nd evidence of the fact that institutions are vitally important for the prosperity of countries as well as for making the simplest transactions between citizens possible. The Course gives an overview of modern institutional theory, its development and current state, its basic instruments and approaches. Special focus is made on ways to use these instruments and approaches for solving real-life problems.

Learning Objectives

to form a detailed view about current development of new institutional theory, about main instruments and approaches
to develop competences, which allow to implement the methodology of new institutional economics towards solving practical problems
to develop competencies, which allow implementing the methodology of new institutional economics towards solving practical problems

Expected Learning Outcomes

Ability to use instruments of game theory and social networks to analyse institutions
Ability to use instruments of game theory to analyse incentives in transactions
Ability to use instruments of game theory to analyse institutions
Ability to use instruments of new institutional economics to analyse contracts
Ability to use instruments of new institutional economics to analyse firms
Ability to use instruments of new institutional economics to analyse particular institutions
Ability to use instruments of new institutional economics to analyse relations between firms, individuals and state
Ability to use theory of institutions in analysis of institutional environment of different settings
Understanding of main questions that could be addressed by New Institutional Theory

Course Contents

Introduction to New Institutional Economics.
Institutions
Transaction Costs
Institutions, Transaction Costs and Networks
Contract Theories
Institutions of Property Rights
Property rights, Agency costs and Economic outputs
Institutional Change, Institutions and Growth.

Assessment Elements

Homework
Control work
Research project
Work on the seminar

Interim Assessment

2021/2022 2nd module
0.2 Homework + 0.25 Work on the seminar + 0.25 Research project + 0.3 Control work

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

Bloom, N., Liang, J., Roberts, J., & Ying, Z. J. (2015). Does Working from Home Work? Evidence from a Chinese Experiment*. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(1), 165–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju032
COASE, R. H. (1988). 1. The Nature of the Firm: Origin. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.6EF0F9C3
Economic behavior and institutions, Eggertsson, T., 1997
Furubotn, E. G., & Richter, R. (2005). Institutions and Economic Theory : The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics (Vol. 2nd ed). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=469024
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2006). Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), 23–48. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.20.2.23
Hendrikse, G., Hippmann, P., & Windsperger, J. (2015). Trust, transaction costs and contractual incompleteness in franchising. Small Business Economics, 44(4), 867–888. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-014-9626-9
Johnson, N. D., & Nye, J. V. C. (2011). Does fortune favor dragons? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, (1), 85. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.eee.jeborg.v78y2011i1p85.97
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=510978
Polterovich, V. (1999). Институциональные Ловушки И Экономические Реформы[Institutional Traps and Economic Reforms]. MPRA Paper. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.pra.mprapa.27257
Property rights for the poor: effects of land titling. (2010). Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.F39178F5
Raymond Fisman, & Shang-Jin Wei. (2009). The Smuggling of Art, and the Art of Smuggling: Uncovering the Illicit Trade in Cultural Property and Antiques. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, (3), 82. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.1.3.82
Steven Tadelis. (2016). Reputation and Feedback Systems in Online Platform Markets. Annual Review of Economics, (1), 321. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325
Sümeyra Atmaca, Koen Schoors, & Marijn Verschelde. (2016). Bank Loyalty, Social Networks And Crisis. Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.p.rug.rugwps.16.923

Recommended Additional Bibliography

Bolton, P. (DE-588)128734906, (DE-576)170475301. (2005). Contract theory / Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: MIT Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edswao&AN=edswao.114696918
Camerer, C. F., & Fehr, E. (2006). When Does “Economic Man” Dominate Social Behavior? Science, 311(5757), 47–52. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1110600
Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=bsu&AN=4493727
Frye, T. (2004). Credible Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia. American Political Science Review, (03), 453. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.cup.apsrev.v98y2004i03p453.466.00

Бакалаврская программа «Мировая экономика»

Адрес

Institutional Economics