Economics of Information

2025/2026

Учебный год

ENG

Обучение ведется на английском языке

3

Кредиты

Кто читает:

Департамент теоретической экономики

Статус:

Курс по выбору

Когда читается:

4-й курс, 3 модуль

Преподаватель

Смирнов Алексей Сергеевич

Course Syllabus

Abstract

The goal of this course is to introduce students to the role of information in Economics, and to cover related theories and applications. The course is divided into two parts. The first part deals with classical static models of strategic communication, disclosure, signaling and screening. The second part is focused on social learning and strategic experimentation. The main purpose of this part is to learn how these theories can be used to study interesting practical questions. The primary language of the course is English. Students should possess basic knowledge of calculus and probability theory.

Learning Objectives

• understand the role of information in modern Economics
• being acquainted with classical and modern ways to model information in Economics
• being able to solve basic and modified models presented in the course
• apply the concepts learned in the course to real life frameworks

Expected Learning Outcomes

• get acquainted with Signaling and Countersignaling models
• getting acquainted with how information transmission between the economic agents can be modeled
• understanding how the economic agents experiment and learn unknown fundamentals

Course Contents

• Asymmetric Information
• Information Transmission
• Experimentation and Learning

Assessment Elements

• Midterm 1
  Midterm 1, covers first 6 classes
• Midterm 2
  Midterm 2 covers classes 8-13
• Final Exam
  Final Eam covers classes 15-20

Interim Assessment

• 2025/2026 3rd module
  0.42 * Final Exam + 0.29 * Midterm 1 + 0.29 * Midterm 2

Bibliography

Recommended Core Bibliography

• Dirk Bergemann, & Juuso Valimaki. (2006). Bandit Problems. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers.
• Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure Of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 123.
• Emir Kamenica, & Matthew Gentzkow. (2011). Bayesian persuasion.
• Jung, W., & Kwon, Y. (1988). Disclosure When The Market Is Unsure Of Information Endowment Of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 146.
• Lones Smith, & Peter Sørensen. (1999). Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning.
• Martin Cripps, Godfrey Keller, & Sven Rady. (2005). Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits.
• Microeconomic theory, Mas-Colell, A., 1995
• Pindyck, R. S. (1991). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment. Journal of Economic Literature, (3), 1110. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsrep&AN=edsrep.a.aea.jeclit.v29y1991i3p1110.48
• Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010
• Vincent P. Crawford, & Joel Sobeli. (1982). Strategic information transmission.

Recommended Additional Bibliography

• Callander, S. (2011). Searching and Learning by Trial and Error. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2277–2308. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2277
• Strategic experimentation. (1999). Econometrica, 67(2), 349–374.
• Viral V. Acharya, Peter M. DeMarzo, & Ilan Kremer. (2010). Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements. NBER Working Papers.

Authors

• Sakhu Sobkhagia
• SMIRNOV ALEKSEI Sergeevich
• Мальбахова Диса Анзоровна